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Abstract 
The paper explores the incentive effects of retirement income transfers – essentially, non-contributory 
cash transfers aimed at reducing poverty among the elderly. A literature review reveals how little 
academic analysis of the impact of these transfers has been completed.   We begin with a taxonomy of 
retirement income transfers, differentiating between ex-ante and ex-post interventions and universal and 
targeted arrangements.  This distinction allows important differences across designs to be highlighted.  
We then provide a simple framework for thinking about what the incentive impacts of the transfers might 
be, distinguishing between effects related to the transfer itself and those related to the financing 
mechanism.  Thus, from theory and available empirical evidence we derive a few policy relevant findings.  
First, incentive effects will depend on the level of the transfer relative to average earnings and the degree 
of integration between the formal and informal sectors in the economy.  In general, for modest transfers, 
negative impacts on savings and labor supply would be contained.  Second, we highlight the tradeoff 
between maintaining low effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) to reduce distortions and keeping the 
program costs at affordable levels.  This tradeoff suggests that universal programs are suboptimal.  Third, 
in terms of design features, we emphasize the importance of implementing a gradual withdrawal of the 
benefit to avoid crowding-out contributory pensions among low income individuals and of indexing the 
eligibility age with life expectancy to contain costs.  Finally we find that matching contributions can be a 
promising instrument to promote savings among individuals with limited savings capacity.  
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1. Introduction 
 
All OECD countries, and many other nations around the world, have implemented 
some form of transfer to guarantee a minimum level of income during old-age.  
Most of the time these are transfers that take place after retirement -- often called 
“social pensions”.  But some countries are also starting to explore transfers that 
take place while individuals are active – so called matching contributions – to 
deliver a pre-funded social pension.  Both types of programs can take a range of 
forms, and vary in the degree of integration with other policies directed to 
providing public support for the retired and elderly.  But they have in common 
provision of cash, usually with some minimum level stipulated, to alleviate 
poverty among the elderly.  Social pensions are offered primarily on a non-
contributory basis.1 It is this which makes them central to any effort to reduce the 
coverage gap in emerging economies, where the informal sector is large, and 
where access to standard social security is not available for much of the 
population.  Matching contributions, on the other hand, are linked to individual 
contributions.  While also serving the goal of guaranteeing a minimum level of 
income during old-age, matching contributions can also provide incentives for 
long-term savings, particularly for individuals with some but limited savings 
capacity who operate outside the formal sector.  
Academic analysis of social pensions and matching contributions has been very 
limited.  This may be due to lack of data, but the incentives to evaluate the 
programs are also lower given that they usually involve relatively small outlays 
compared with standard social security and other in-kind provision programs, 
such as health.  If coverage of the financial risks and shortfalls faced by the 
elderly in emerging economies is to be substantially increased over any short 
period, however, then it is likely that retirement income transfers will become a 
more significant international policy paradigm, driven by the global demographic 
                                                 
1 Note that this definition separates retirement income transfers, including social pensions, from 
standard social security, except insofar as social security might incorporate a “minimum pension”, 
provided independently of contribution history. It also excludes public provision of services, such as 
long term care and health, which will likely be important to the elderly. 
shift currently underway.  As shown in Chapter 2, formal retirement income 
schemes are thought to cover fewer than 15% of the world’s households and less 
than 10% of the world’s working-age population (see also Holzmann et al. 2001 
and Gillion et al. 2000).  Most of those working without coverage live and work in 
developing countries (Willmore 2007).  It is therefore timely to document what 
we do know about the impacts of retirement income transfers, and to consider 
what might be the most useful framework for further analysis.  
In what follows, we begin with a taxonomy of retirement income transfers.  This 
fills out the rather nebulous characterization offered above, and allows important 
differences across program designs to be highlighted.  In Section 3 we then 
provide a simple framework for thinking about what the incentive impacts of 
social pensions might be.  Section 4 offers a brief overview of the economic 
literature on the incentive impacts of retirement transfers, mostly focused on 
social pensions.  While excellent reviews of the literature analyzing social 
assistance programs exist (for example, Atkinson and Micklewright 1991, Moffitt 
1992), these do not cover retirement income programs, so even a brief review may 
be of use.  Finally, in Section 5, we use a stochastic simulation model of the 
Egyptian pension system to illustrate the revenue requirements, and associated 
fiscal burden, of alternative social pension designs.  Section 6 concludes.  
2.  Taxonomy of Retirement Income Transfers 
As briefly mentioned above, we distinguish between transfers that take place after 
retirement age (ex-post transfers) and transfers that take place before retirement 
age (ex-ante transfers).2  Section 4 will show that the two types of transfers can 
have different effects on individual behaviors.  Thus, when analyzing how to 
secure a minimum level of income during old-age for different population groups, 
it is important to take an integrated approach and consider the cost and benefits of 
both interventions simultaneously.     
Ex-post transfers are by far the most common.  Four types can be readily 
observed: social assistance, targeted pensions, basic (universal) pensions and 
minimum pensions (Whitehouse 2005).  Social assistance refers to general 
programs that also cover older people.  Targeted pensions cover specific schemes 
                                                 
2 For a discussion see also Robalino et al., 2008a. 
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for older people that are resource tested.  Basic schemes are universal flat-rate 
programs which are non-contributory.  Minimum pensions are a specification 
within a more standard social security scheme, which stipulates that qualified 
members will receive a minimum pension, sometimes conditioned on a certain 
contribution history.3  They remain, however, a special case of targeted pensions 
where the test is based on the pension income generated by the contributory 
system (see below).  Ex-ante interventions are more recent in the policy agenda of 
governments.  These basically involve government matches to the contributions 
that individuals make to a given pension plan, which can be DB or DC, funded or 
unfunded.  By design these transfers are resources tested.   
In terms of targeted pensions it is possible to distinguish three types: those which 
are tested only against pension-income;4 those which employ a broader definition 
of income for the test; and broader means-tested benefits, including, for example, 
assets.5  However, means testing of this type is feasible only if the State can 
measure personal consumption at a modest incremental cost.  This requires a 
bureaucracy capable of observing personal income and holdings of durable 
consumption goods.  Under these two conditions, targeting allows both a 
reduction of the fiscal cost and stronger redistribution.  These two conditions are 
also considered necessary for the implementation of matching contributions.  
Unfortunately, not all emerging economies have this type of institutional capacity 
(see Valdes-Prieto 2008).  Even if good records are available for the “rich” who 
therefore can be excluded, it can be difficult to means-test the majority of the 
labor force   
Other dimensions of differentiation within retirement income transfers can be 
readily identified, for example, the definition of the consumer (couple, family, or 
                                                 
3 An alternative but related classification is offered by Willmore (2007). He divides what he calls 
“minimum pensions” into universal non-means tested pensions, residence based pensions, recovery 
pensions, and social assistance (page 27).  In addition, in countries which do not hold adequate records 
of economic activity among its citizens, community based social assistance, which may simply 
represent some implicit or explicit risk sharing within a village or other local level jurisdiction, may be 
most effective in expanding coverage.  
4 Robalino et al. (2008a) shows that basic and minimum pensions can be characterized by the type of 
“claw-back.”  In the case of the classic minimum pension (top-up) the claw-back is set to 1 (there is a 
100 percent marginal tax on additional pension income).  In the case of the basic (universal pension) 
the claw-back is equal to zero.   
5 Other distinctions between means testing also exist – for example, many means tests exempt the 
family home, with impacts on household choice (Sane and Piggott 2008) 
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household), or eligibility conditions (residency, citizenship).  But we believe the 
taxonomy presented above is operational and descriptive of the major social 
pension designs, and are categorized to allow accessible analysis of incentive 
effects. 
Within the OECD, all countries have at least one of these types of pensions 
operating (see Chapter 6 and OECD 2005, page 23).  The majority offers a 
targeted pension, and the next most common is the minimum pension.  Social 
assistance and the basic pension are less frequently encountered.  Only five 
countries rely on general social assistance programs as the only non-contributory 
program for the old.  In middle and low income countries minimum pensions in 
the contributory system are also quite prevalent (see Chapter 1).  Several countries 
have also adopted some form of “social pension” (see Chapters 4 and 5).  
Matching contributions are more recent initiatives with pilots taking place in the 
Dominican Republic (Law Passed), India (implemented in West Bengal), Mexico 
(implemented), and Vietnam (Law under consideration) (see Chapter 9).    
3. Analyzing the incentive effects of social pensions: a conceptual framework 
Like any other tax-financed financial transfer, retirement income transfers impact 
on incentives at two points in economic transactions: when the tax is levied, and 
when the transfer is received.  In contrast to social security plans, where it may be 
argued that some dimensions of behavioral impact are neutralized through the 
actuarial link between contribution and benefit, social pensions are by definition 
redistributive, and the two points of price distortion need to be considered 
separately.6 
To capture both points of intervention, however, it is necessary to adopt an 
economy-wide conceptual framework.  Indeed, there are complex interactions 
between effective marginal tax rates facing those eligible to receive transfers, 
those not eligible, and those who are being taxed to finance it.  The problem is 
also complicated by dynamic inter-temporal effects:  the perspective of benefiting 
from a transfer during old-age might affect decisions about labor supply and 
savings during active life.  So, individuals who would not be eligible for a transfer 
if the transfer program did not exist, would become eligible for a transfer because 
                                                 
6 For a discussion of links between redistribution and incentives see also Robalino et al. 2008a. 
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the program is in place.  In fact, even if the transfer is not targeted (i.e., there are 
no conditionalities of any type) and therefore generates a pure income effect, 
individuals might have incentives to change labor supply and savings rates over 
the life-cycle.   
The usual place to start when assessing the incentive effects of retirement income 
transfers and social assistance programs in general, is to look at the marginal tax 
rates (EMTRs) facing potential beneficiaries.  The story goes that targeted 
programs can induce large EMTRs and can reduce incentives to work and save for 
individuals close to the “eligibility line.”  Because efficiency costs, or excess 
burdens increase disproportionately with EMTRs, their estimation is a natural 
focus for analysis.7  There are, however, potentially important tradeoffs between 
the EMTR, the number of people affected by the targeting, and other explicit taxes 
in the economy.  We discuss these issues next. 
Assume for the moment that we wish to compare a targeted with a universal social 
pension.  First, while a means tested pension will impose high EMTRs on those at 
the margin of eligibility, where withdrawal of the pension is operative, many 
individuals potentially impacted by a universal pension will be unaffected by a 
targeted pension.  The rate of withdrawal of the means tested pension, sometimes 
called the taper rate or claw-back, will impact on this.  The lower the taper rate, 
the lower will be the EMTR, but the more people will be affected.8  Second, as the 
taper rate (and the associated EMTR) is reduced, the overall revenue requirement 
of the program will increase, and this will require higher tax rates to be applied to 
others in the economy, probably workers.  If they already pay high taxes, as in 
developed countries, then the same argument about disproportionate efficiency 
costs of high marginal tax rates will apply, offsetting the EMTR reduction among 
pension recipients.  If the economy is less developed, with low tax rates, it is 
likely that the tax imposition will retard the development of the formal sector – or 
affect employment levels when programs are financed through pay-roll taxes (the 
common approach in the case of minimum pensions).  Overall, the efficiency 
impact of the two designs will be a somewhat subtle trade-off between keeping a 
                                                 
7 This idea is most readily captured as the “Harberger t square rule”, which stipulates that under simple 
assumptions, the efficiency cost of a distortionary tax increases with the square of the tax rate.  
8 This point was first made by Blinder and Rosen (1985).  Sefton (2008) makes the same point in the 
context of means tested pensions in the UK. 
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low EMTR for potential beneficiaries and keeping the tax-burden of the economy 
at affordable levels.   
Figure 1 captures these effects graphically.  The upper panel of the figure maps 
gross income, yg (on the horizontal axis) into net income, yn (vertical axis). M 
gives the level of minimum income available under the assistance scheme.9  A 
100% taper, that is, dollar for dollar withdrawal of the transfer with increments in 
gross income, is represented by the horizontal line MA. A 50% taper is 
represented by MA’. For an individual at any level yg* the cost of the pension is 
given by the vertical distance between the 45 degree line and the relevant 
disposable income line, MA or MA’. The fiscal cost of the program, however, will 
depend on the number of recipients, whose frequency is mapped in the lower 
panel.  While the frequency distribution shown is illustrative, it is consistent with 
available evidence. The revenue cost increases dramatically as the taper rate is 
reduced, necessarily requiring increases in distortionary taxes elsewhere in the 
economy.  Moreover, the income effect generated among those not affected by the 
claw-back can still change behaviors regarding labor supply, savings, and 
retirement. 
The net impacts of these distortions on labor supply and savings are difficult to 
estimate and, as the next section will show, the empirical evidence to date is quite 
limited.  Thus, to provide further insights, in the remainder of this section we go 
back to first principles and analyze potential incentives effects on labor supply 
using a life-cycle behavioral model.10  General equilibrium effects resulting from 
the tradeoffs between the level of the EMTR and other explicit taxes are not 
considered here.  Section 5, however, attempts to estimate the magnitude of this 
tradeoff and discusses potential implications. 
In the life-cycle framework individuals are assumed to make decisions about how 
long and where to work, and how much to save, in order to maximize inter-
temporal utility which depends on consumption.  In the model used here, 
economic agents choose at each time t the savings rate, whether to retire or not, 
                                                 
9 Depending on the nature of the scheme, this may be guaranteed to all, all above a certain age, or only 
to those enrolled in a social security program. 
10 The life cycle model of consumption smoothing may be less relevant in dealing with social pensions 
than for some other applications, but is nevertheless the most rigorous analytic framework available. 
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and the level of effort invested in keeping or finding formal sector jobs.11  Thus 
the model can be used to understand trade-offs between formal sector work and 
unemployment, inactivity, or informal work.  On the latter, the implicit 
assumption is that individuals have some degree of mobility between formal and 
informal sector jobs (and vice-versa); the labor market is not fully segmented.  
Transition probabilities between formal and informal jobs (including self-
employment) then have two components:  an exogenous component that does not 
depend on individual decisions, although it can be correlated with individual 
characteristics (e.g., formal firms that shut-down or downsize); and an 
endogenous component that depends on individual preferences and choices.  In 
this setting, which seems to be an accurate description of the labor market in 
middle income countries like Chile, Brazil and Mexico (see for instance Bosh and 
Maloney 2007), the design of the transfer program would not only affect savings 
rates and retirement ages, but also the size of the formal sector relative to the 
informal sector.  This may have a major impact on development if the informal 
sector uses less productive technology.12 The formal-informal split, of course, 
would be less important or non-existent in countries where the labor market is 
segmented and the informal sector takes the form of a warehouse for residual 
labor.   
We use the model to illustrate what would be the impact of various forms of 
retirement income transfers on contribution densities, average retirement ages, and 
program costs.  Because choices depend on preferences for future and present 
consumption, attitudes towards risks, and views regarding formal vs informal 
sector jobs, we consider a large range of possible behavioral responses.13   
                                                 
11 For a formal description of the model see Robalino et al. (2008a). 
12 Piggott and Whalley (2001) show that in a model with an informal sector and self supply, a broad-
based value added tax may be less efficient than a tax on goods alone, if services can be provided either 
in the formal or informal sectors.  
13 The model dynamics depend on five main parameters:  preferences regarding consumption and 
leisure, preferences regarding formal vs. informal work, attitudes towards risks, the rate of time 
preference, and the distributions of two exogenous shocks that affect movements in and out of the 
social security system (independently of individual decisions).  The Brazilian yearly household survey 
was used to create a pseudo panel by age-cohorts and estimate the joint distribution of model 
parameters based on a generalized version of the Gibbs sampler.  Different designs of the retirement 
income transfer are assessed “across” the joint distribution of model parameters (see Robalino et al. 
2008a).  
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The main results from the analysis are summarized in Figure 2.  Each panel 
graphs the change in contribution densities and retirement ages relative to the 
relevant counterfactual over various combinations of model parameters.  There are 
three main insights.  First, introducing a minimum pension in the form of a top-up 
(i.e., 100 percent EMTR) can induce important reductions in contribution 
densities and retirement ages, depending on the level of the transfer relative to 
average earnings. 14  For instance, in our simulations, a pension equivalent to 42 
percent of an individual’s earnings (the case of Brazil for the average worker) 
reduces contribution densities by up to 30 percentage points and the retirement 
age by up to 7 years (see first panel Figure 2).  A more modest minimum pension 
equivalent to 25 percent of average earnings, on the other hand, reduces 
contribution densities by less than 10 percentage points and retirement ages by 
less than two years in most cases (see second panel of Figure 2).  Retirement ages 
fall due to the income effect that makes early retirement more affordable.  At the 
same time, the EMTR that is created by the top-up penalizes formal sector work:  
the individual can receive higher net earnings and enjoy a higher level of present 
consumption if working in the formal sector, but this reduces the level of the 
transfer, and therefore consumption, in the future.  The rational response to this 
inter-temporal tradeoff is to participate less in the social security.15 
A second insight is that a gradual claw-back of the minimum pension – in essence 
a reduction of the EMTR – can significantly increase contribution densities 
relative to the case of a 100 percent EMTR.  The exceptions are cases where 
individuals have high inter-temporal substitution rates and strong preferences over 
leisure (see the third panel of Figure 2 where the numbers in parenthesis are the 
elasticity of utility relative to consumption and the rate of time preference).  These 
individuals value future utility less and therefore care less about the level of the 
future transfer.  They also value current consumption less and are willing to accept 
                                                 
14 The baseline scenario assumes an earnings related pension system that pays a 3 percent rate of return 
on contributions (the equivalent of Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) system with individual 
accounts revalorized at 3 percent).  Wages also grow at 3 percent per year and the interest rate on 
savings is 4 percent real.  The minimum retirement age is 60 years.   
15 The effect is stronger among individuals with a low rate of time preference, meaning they discount 
future “utility” at a low and even negative rate (which various estimates from the literature suggest is 
the most frequent case).  Individuals with strong preferences for consumption relative to leisure are 
also more affected.  when retired, other things being equal, they prefer a higher level of consumption 
than an individual with strong preferences for leisure. 
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lower life-time earnings in exchange for more “flexibility” in work arrangements 
(i.e., by investing less efforts in finding and keeping formal sector jobs).  In this 
case, the income effect of a lower EMTR induces lower participation in the social 
security.  On the other hand, for individuals with stronger preferences for 
consumption over leisure and lower rates of time preference (the more common 
case) a claw-back of 30 percent increases contribution densities relative to the top-
up by 1 to 12 percentage points.  At the extreme, a flat transfer (i.e., a 0 percent 
EMTR) can increase contribution densities by 5 to 15 percentage points.  Clearly, 
as previously discussed, a lower EMTR also increases the cost of the transfer.  But 
the increase depends on the pre-retirement contribution density.  For densities 
below 40 percent, the increase in costs is below 6 percent in the case of the flat 
pension and 3.8 percent in the case of the 30 percent claw back.  For higher 
contribution densities the increase in the cost is much higher; for full career 
workers low EMTRs can increase the cost of the transfer dramatically (mainly 
because in the absence of a claw-back most individual would not be eligible for 
the minimum pension).  In these cases, however, the claw-back would not be 
needed in the first place.  Another result regarding the claw back is that the 
income effect of a lower EMTR can also reduce retirement ages in most cases (see 
fourth panel of Figure 2).  If the system is well designed, however, lower 
retirement ages do not affect its financial sustainability.    
The final insight is that matching contributions can have a significant positive 
effect on contribution densities.  The fifth panel of Figure 2 shows the effect on 
contribution densities and retirement ages of a matching contribution program 
designed to cost, in present value, the equivalent of a flat pension equal to 42 
percent of average earnings that is paid at age 60 after 40 years of contribution.  
The results show that for most combinations of model parameters contribution 
densities and retirement ages increase.  For the contribution density the increase 
can be in the 1 to 30 percentage points range, in most cases between 5 and 10 
percentage points.  The result is not surprising:  the more the individual 
contributes, the higher the level of the transfer.  One would expect therefore that 
higher contribution densities would come at high costs.  Similar to the case of the 
claw back, however, high costs are only associated with high pre-transfer 
contribution densities.  For contribution densities below 60 percent, which would 
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be the most common case in middle and low income countries, the cost of the 
matching would be similar to that of the flat pension.  Adding restrictions in terms 
of the maximum cap on transferred capital could bring costs down.  But of course, 
this creates a positive EMTR on contributions that would also bring down the 
contribution density.  There lies the tradeoff between lower distortions in labor 
markets and lower fiscal costs.   
It is worth noting that, theoretically, a matching contribution can generate the 
same level of income protection during old age, at the same fiscal cost, but with 
less distortions on savings decisions than a social pension.  This can be seen in 
Figure 3 which refers to a simple two period consumption optimization model.  
Each line in the figure gives the present value of utility as a function of 
consumption in period 1 – which given income determines consumption in period 
two.  The left panel shows the effects of a social pension equal to 20 percent of 
average earnings (targeted to individuals with earnings below 30 percent) and 
combinations between the social pension and various levels of matching in a 
system based on a 10 percent contribution rate.  We see that the social pension 
creates a “kink” in the utility function that makes it optimal to increase 
consumption in period one.  Matching contributions on the other hand move the 
utility function up.  A first observation is that matching contribution systems 
would be attractive; individuals would have incentives to enroll since they 
increase inter-temporal utility – even when a social pension is available.  But the 
level of the matching is important.  If the matching is too low (M=1) individuals 
will have incentives to enroll in the matching system and yet benefit from the 
social pension at the end by further reducing savings rates.  In the first panel of 
Figure 3, it is only when M=3 that individuals can no longer “reach” the social 
pension (i.e., even with very low savings rate they would not be eligible).  At 
M=3, however, the matching costs more than the social pension (0.3 of average 
earnings instead of 0.2).  But these costs can be reduced by bringing down the 
ceiling for eligibility for the social pension.  This is done in the right panel of 
Figure 3 where the ceiling is set to 20 percent of average earnings.  There, a 
matching of two times the contribution rate (costs the same as the social pension) 
generates higher or similar levels of utility than the social pension but provides 
incentives for higher savings while young. 
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4. What do we know about the economic effects of social pensions? Five 
examples 
As foreshadowed in the introduction, the literature on the incentive effects of 
social pensions is sparse.  Partly this is because of the limited range of natural 
experiments that have presented themselves as candidates for empirical analysis. 
In what follows, we briefly review five studies.  The first centers on the 
Supplemental Security Income scheme in the US, a sharply means tested 
instrument available to all age groups, but importantly used by the poor elderly 
not eligible for social security benefits. Aside from the specific findings on 
incentive impacts, this work also points up the importance of interactions between 
programs, an issue which policymakers do not always confront in designing a new 
policy instrument, or reforming an old one.16 Next we turn to the Chilean system, 
a mandatory funded scheme with a minimum pension guarantee available after 20 
years of contributions, and an underlying, but very modest, welfare payment plan. 
Our third focus of analysis is South Africa, where a means tested pension is 
available to, and taken up by, about 80% of the elderly, predominantly black. 
Here, the impacts of a pension on other members of a household is confronted, 
with surprising outcomes.  The fourth case study is Brazil which has implemented 
a targeted social pension for the elderly poor as well as a universal rural pension.  
Finally, we turn to minimum pensions in Europe, focusing especially on Spain. 
Our review is not by any means comprehensive, but we hope it is representative 
and covers at least some of the important studies.17 
It is worth emphasizing at the outset that identifying and quantifying the incentive 
effects of social pension programs is a more than usually challenging exercise, 
and results are usually to be treated with caution. The recipients of means tested 
benefits are, after all, meant to be different in germane ways from their non-
pension recipient counterparts.  As well, and especially in emerging economies, 
data reliability may be poor.  As Case and Deaton (1998) put it: 
                                                 
16 On program interactions see also World Bank (2008). 
17 Two important social pensions that we have not treated are those in Australia and the UK. The  
Australian means tested age pension has received only limited attention, but is analysed by Creedy and 
Kalb (2006), who in the context of a larger micro-simulation study of tax reform, analyse its labour 
supply impacts. The UK reformed its means tested pensions, changing the taper from 100% to 40%; 
Sefton et al (2008) use a dynamic programming approach to analyse the labour supply impacts of the 
change.   
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“Simple correlations and regressions have a tendency to link 
pension receipt with undesirable outcomes, but these results can 
reasonably be attributed to the fact that pension recipients are 
different from others—in particular they are poorer and less well 
educated—or more subtly, to measurement error in income, so that 
even conditional on low measured income, the receipt of the 
pension may indicate low economic status.” (1998, page 1360.) 
 
The US Supplemental Security Income Program: Effects on Savings and Labour 
Supply.  
The Supplemental Security Income Program is a means tested monthly stipend 
provided to aged (legally deemed to be 65 or older), blind, or disabled persons.  It 
is paid by the federal government, but many states provide supplements to the 
federal benefit. The program is administered by the Social Security 
Administration. The program was created by the Nixon administration in 1974 to 
replace various state-administered programs which served the same purpose.  
Currently, the federal payment stands at US$637 a month for a single person, or 
US$956 for a couple. The means test income limits may vary based on the state 
the individual lives in, his/her federal living arrangement, the number of people 
living in the residence, and the type of income. The resources limit is about $2000 
for a single individual and $3000 for a married couple, in addition to an owner 
occupied residence and a motor vehicle. There were about 7.4 million 
beneficiaries as of March 2008, costing about 0.3% of GDP. Although 
administered by the Social Security Administration, the program is largely 
separate from Social Security.  But it is a requirement that eligible recipients apply 
for social security before qualifying for SSI.18  In 2007, 11.1% of Federal SSI 
payments were received by aged but not disabled individuals and 8.4% payments 
received by both aged and disabled individuals. Most payments were received by 
disabled individuals who were under 65 years old.19 
                                                 
18 Our sources for information about the SSI provisions and payments include 
http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/  
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ssir/SSI07/index.html 
 
19 Annual report of the Social Security Supplementary Income, Social Security Administration 2008.   
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In two related studies, Neumark and Powers (1998, 2000) investigate the impact 
of the SSI on saving and pre-retirement labour supply, respectively. In the Saving 
study, they exploit state variations in SSI benefits to estimate the effects of SSI on 
saving, using data from the 1984 Survey of Income Program Participation. In 
order to derive their main result, they control for possible correlations between 
disability and income support by dropping individuals with any self-reporting 
work-impairing disability from their sample. By using the restricted sample, they 
are able to show that a $100 increase in annual benefits reduce saving by $281 
among likely participants between ages 60 and 64. Their results suggest that a 
means tested retirement program can distort saving decisions of a portion of the 
population. They caution against applying their findings to social security systems 
more generally, because the SSI program serves a poor population with relatively 
low lifetime labor supply, Social Security, in general, serves a higher-income 
population with higher lifetime labor supply.  
 
The later study focuses on pre-retirement labor supply.  Using a similar empirical 
approach, they find evidence that generous SSI benefits reduce the pre-retirement 
labor supply (and earnings) of men who are likely to participate in SSI after 
retirement, as they near the eligibility age, especially men who are eligible for 
early Social Security benefits, which may be used to offset their reduced labor 
income. Their basic results show that generous SSI supplement reduces the 
probability of employment between ages 60 and 64 by 10%. The findings here are 
more robust, and secondary evidence suggests a causal relationship between the 
existence of SSI and labor supply behavior in this group.  
The strongest effects are for those aged 62-64, who are able to take early social 
security entitlements.  That is, the existence of SSI might encourage participation 
in another program at an earlier age than would otherwise be the case. This points 
to a subtle but extremely important feature in social pension design – that 
interactions with other programs may produce incentive effects not envisioned by 
policymakers concerned with the integrity of the social pension itself.20  
                                                 
20 For a discussion of the interactions between social insurance programs and their effects on labor 
supply and savings see Robalino et al. (2008a).  
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The Chilean minimum pension guarantee and assistance pension: effects on 
informal sector work 
The current Chilean pension system can be decomposed into three main pillars: a 
poverty prevention pillar, a contributory pillar and a voluntary pillar.  The poverty 
prevention pillar, before the 2008 reform, was based on two components: a 
means-tested assistance pension 21  (the PASIS) and the Minimum Pension 
Guarantee (MPG) for individuals who contributed for at least 20 years to the 
individual capitalization scheme, but that were not able to finance a minimum 
amount for their retirement.22  A recent study argues that the pre-reform non-
contributory system contributed to reduce contribution densities; it provided 
incentives for informal Vs formal sector work (see Valdez 2008).  First, among 
low income workers, the PASI provided incentives to contribute only to the point 
where the contributory pension surpasses 50 percent of the minimum pension.  
After this point, the PASI drops to zero; in essence a very large marginal tax to 
additional pension income.  Similarly, the MPG provided incentives to contribute 
only to the point of eligibility (20 years).  Additional contributions afterwards 
would have not increased the value of the total pension (contributory pension plus 
subsidy) paid by the contributory system.  This implies a 100 percent marginal tax 
on additional pension income.  This is a strong incentive to take informal sector 
jobs (despite the potential loss of productivity) in order to save mandatory 
contributions to the pension system and avoid paying implicit taxes on pension 
subsidies.  Although, to date, there are no rigorous impact evaluations of this 
effect, general statistics suggest it was important.  Thus, the coverage of the 
PASIS increased from 7.7 to 18.6 percent between 1992 and 2003, a period when 
the value of the MPG and the PASIS increased considerably relative to economy 
wide average earnings (see Valdez 2008).  This suggests that a larger share of 
workers, including those who before considered that the transfer was too low, 
chose to maintain low contribution densities.  The problem of low contribution 
densities in Chile where more than half of workers have contribution densities 
                                                 
21  The requirements for the PASI are:  (i) to be at least 65 years of age; (ii) not to have another 
pension; (iii) to have earnings that are below 50 percent of the minimum pension; and (iv) to have per 
capita family earnings that are below 50 percent of the minimum pension.   
22 For an analysis of the current system and the 2008 reform see Rofman et al. (2008).  The authors 
indicate that as of March 2008, the minimum pension guarantee was equivalent to US$222 (US$242 
after age 70 and $257 after age 75) and the PASIS program provided old age, disability or mental 
deficiency benefits equivalent to US$110 before age 70, US$117 after age 70 and US$128 after age 75. 
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below 50 percent is well documented in Berstein, Larrain and Pino (2006).  In 
fact, a similar phenomenon is observed in Argentina and Uruguay (see Table 1).   
The 2008 reform replaces these programs with a unique scheme that guarantees 
that all individuals in the 60% less affluent fraction of the population will have a 
guaranteed basic pension, regardless of their contribution history.  This new 
program provides old age and disability subsidies, financed by general revenues of 
the State.  Individuals with no contributions are entitled to an old-age Basic 
Solidarity Pension (PBS), once they reach 65 years of age, and fulfill the affluence 
and residence requirements.  Individuals who make contributions can still receive 
part of the subsidy.  Indeed, there is a claw-back based on the value of the 
contributory pension but which will be closer to 37 percent in the steady-state, as 
opposed to 100 percent today (see Valdez 2008).  The resulting subsidy is called 
the Solidarity Complement (APS) and has the same affluence and residence 
requirements.23   
Given the more gradual withdrawal of the subsidy, the reform is expected to 
improve incentives to contribute and therefore reduce incentives for informal 
sector work.  Clearly, other things being equal, reducing the claw-back rate also 
increases the cost of the system, thus demanding higher fiscal revenues and higher 
explicit taxes (see discussion in Section 2).  Some have therefore argued that there 
is an optimal claw-back rate where the marginal benefits of improved incentives 
to contribute equals the marginal costs of higher taxes.  In the case of Chile this 
optimal claw-back would be around 20 percent (see Poblete, 2005).   
Regardless of the claw-back rate, however, the problem that remains with the 
reformed system has to do with the level of the PBS which is expected to reach 82 
percent of the median salary by year 2009! (see Valdez 2008).  Thus, regardless of 
the progressive claw-back rate, the high PBS is very likely to reduce incentives for 
formal sector work.   
The Brazilian rural pension: effects on labor supply and retirement decisions 
The Brazilian national pension system is managed by the National Social Security 
Institute (INSS) and includes contributory and non-contributory arrangements.  
                                                 
23 See Rofman et al. (2008) for a more detailed description of the reformed non-contributory system. 
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The contributory system for private sector workers offers old-age, disability and 
survivorship pensions (RGPS benefits).  It is a defined benefit plan with pay-as-
you-go financing.  In addition, Brazil offers a means tested flat pension for the 
elderly poor (BPC) and an aging pension for agricultural workers.  The latter 
offers a pension that can be a function of past earnings or equal to the minimum 
pension guarantee (pisso providenciario) which ever is higher.  Most rural 
workers have short contribution histories and therefore retire with the minimum 
pension which today is equal to the minimum wage.24   
A recent study exploited a reform implemented in 1991 to estimate the effect of 
the rural pension on retirement decisions and labor supply (see de Carvalho Filho, 
2008).  The reform in question reduced the minimum eligibility age for old-age 
benefits for rural workers from 65 to 60 for men and 55 for women; increased the 
minimum benefit paid to rural old-age beneficiaries from 50% to 100% of the 
minimum wage; and extended old-age benefits to rural workers who were not 
heads of households, thus expanding coverage to many married female rural 
workers.  Because the minimum pension is not means tested and there are no 
conditions regarding contribution histories (no vesting period) it generates a pure 
income effect.  
                                                
The author uses a triple differences-in-differences approach to identify the effect 
of the rural pension.  The first difference involves a treated (rural workers) and 
control (urban workers not eligible for the rural pension) group.  The second 
difference involves affected and unaffected workers within the treated group.  
Indeed, the 55-59 and 65-69 were, if anything, less affected by the reform than the 
age group 60-64.  The results show a statistically significant increase of 25.40 
percentage points in the benefit take-up rates of rural workers aged 60-64.  Also, 
the proportion of rural workers aged 60-64 who “did not work in the week of 
reference” increased by 12.56 percentage points more than for urban workers of 
the same age (difference-indifferences), during the period immediately before and 
after the reform.  This difference was not observed among the “unaffected” 
groups.  Therefore, triple-differences estimates show a statistically significant 
increase of 10.96 and 6.03 percentage points in the proportion of rural workers 
 
24 For a recent assessment of redistribution and incentives in the Brazilian system see World Bank 
2008. 
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aged 60-64 who “did not work in the week of reference”, when the “unaffected 
group” is respectively males aged 55-59 and 65-69.  In addition, “total hours of 
work in all jobs” for rural workers of the “affected age” decreased relatively to 
urban workers by 5.80 hours per week, during the period immediately before and 
after the reform.  The triple-differences estimates show a relative reduction of 6.49 
and 2.81 hours of work per week for rural workers aged 60-64 relatively to the 55-
59 and 65-69 age groups respectively (only the former is statistically significant). 
The author argues therefore that estimates of the poverty reduction effect of old-
age benefits in developing countries should take into account the negative labor 
supply impact of those benefits.  The author also sustains that the finding of a 
sizeable pure income effect suggests that means testing is more desirable than 
otherwise, since one important cost of means testing is its negative labor supply 
consequences.  The paper also showed that more educated workers are better able 
to benefit from social programs than less educated ones, perhaps because either 
they are more able to understand the formal rules of the game, or they are in 
general better informed.  
South Africa’s means tested age pension:  effects on labor supply and job seeking 
efforts 
The South Africa social pension has been in existence since 1928, although much 
analysis focuses on the period after 1993, when it was reformed. It is available to 
women aged 60 or more, and men from 65.In practice it pays the maximum each 
month (820 Rands in 2007, about USD105) to anyone without a private pension 
(Ardlington et al. 2007). The social pension is about twice the median per capita 
African income, or about 20% of GDP per capita, and thus a very important 
income source for many Africans. Altogether, there were more than 2 million 
households with pension beneficiaries in 2007. The IMF estimated South Africa’s 
GDP per capita as US$ 5906 (approximately US$492 per month) in 2007. Its cost 
was estimated at 1.4% of GDP in 2006.25  
                                                 
25 Sources for this paragraph include: 
http://www.helpage.org/Researchandpolicy/PensionWatch/SouthAfrica 
http://www.dsd.gov.za/dynamic/dynamicXML.aspx?pageid=472 
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The program has received a good deal of academic attention, perhaps because of 
its importance as a potential model for the developing world.  The most recent and 
comprehensive study is that of Ardlington et al (2007), who focus on the 
implications of pension receipt for the whole household, assuming some form of 
income sharing.  Standard analysis assumes households pool income, so that labor 
supplied by prime age workers is reduced as a result of social pensions. 
Alternatively, however, as the authors put it: 
“if social transfers allow households to overcome credit constraints, 
enabling households to bankroll potential migrants or potential work 
seekers who need financial support to look for jobs, then social 
transfers like the pension may promote employment and help 
households to break out of poverty traps.” (page 2).  
Early studies suggested that the pension had the expected impact of reducing labor 
supply (Bertrand et al 2003).  But later research pointed to an interesting 
interaction between household receipt of an age pension and the probability that a 
younger member of the household might migrate to find work.  While the standard 
result held for workers resident in the household, the ability of households 
receiving a pension to help its younger members find work elsewhere offset this 
result  (Ardlington et al 2007).. This effect appears to operate both through simply 
credit constraint relief, and through freeing older household members from work 
so that children might be cared for, thus providing the opportunity for more 
productive younger workers to seek employment.  
This finding expands the range of potential impacts of the social pension in 
developing countries where coverage rates are low.  It suggests that, at least in 
developing countries, the role of the social pension might be much more varied 
than economists and policymakers have supposed, and that these potential impacts 
should be assessed when such policies are being considered.     
The minimum pension in Spain:  effects on retirement and savings decisions.  
Minimum pensions which are part of the national contributory system are quite 
prevalent in Europe (see Chapter 3).  Recent evaluations have shown that current 
systems have deficiencies of various kinds when compared with the particular 
standard set by the EMP and that the effects are highly uneven across countries 
(see Atkinson et al., 2002).  Much attention has been given to the analysis of the 
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effects on retirement decision through different approaches.  Important among 
these are the study of implicit incentives (Gruber and Wise, 1999; Blöndal and 
Scarpetta, 1998); reduced-form models of retirement (Samwick,1998); and models 
of conditional consumer decisions in a given economic environment (Stock and 
Wise,1991; Rust, 1997; and Boldrin et al., 2004).  In the remainder of this section 
we focus on the minimum pension in Spain analyzed in Jiménez-Martín and 
Sánchez-Martín (2006 and 2007).  The authors quantitatively assess the impact of 
the Spanish pension rules, especially the minimum pension scheme, on the 
retirement and savings patterns of Spanish workers.26   
The public Spanish pension system (old-age, survivorship, disability) has two 
components.  The first component is a compulsory state pension system, universal 
and financed by taxes, which guarantees a minimum source of income to all 
individuals.  The second component is a defined benefit plan financed by 
contributions on pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) basis.  The crucial element for 
redistribution and solidarity is the minimum pension.  During the late 1970s and 
early 1980s, close to 70% of the Spanish pensioners received a minimum pension; 
in 2001 this percentage was still a very sizeable 32% of the stock of pensioners, 
with about 25% of new recipients starting out with a minimum pension.  The 
minimum pension has been growing faster than the minimum wage and since year 
2000 the minimum pension is higher than the minimum wage.  Data on retirement 
patterns suggest that this minimum pension is far from being neutral (in a labor 
supply sense), since it increases retirement probabilities for an important fraction 
of workers, especially low income workers, which are potentially affected by the 
minimum pension. 
The authors show that the minimum pension increases the opportunity cost of the 
forgone pension income and utterly eliminates the incentive to work due to the 
early retirement penalties.  These two effects make it optimal for most low-
income workers to retire at the earliest possible age (i.e., the ERA).  This 
substitution effect is accompanied by an income effect as the minimum pension 
effectively increases individuals’ life cycle wealth.  This income effect also 
                                                 
26 This task is undertaken with the help of a life cycle model with an endogenous retirement decision 
and the prohibition to borrow from future pension income. This model is used as the data generating 
process in an structural maximum likelihood estimation, carried out over a unique, very large sample of 
labor records obtained from the Spanish Social Security administration (HLSS). 
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weakens the incentive to keep working in pre-retirement ages.  These findings are 
reminiscent of Neumark and Powers (1998, 2000) findings on SSI.  The net effect 
is a change in the shape of the retirement distribution in a fundamental way, 
shifting substantial amounts of probability mass from 65 and the immediately 
preceding early retirement ages (between 61 and 64) to the ERA of 60 (see Figure 
4).  As minimum pensions carry the retirement age of large groups of individuals 
forward, the distribution changes from a uni-modal shape (with a single peak at 
65) to a bi-modal one (with peaks at both 60 and 65).  A remarkable spike 
emerges at the age of 60, as the probability of retiring exactly at the ERA almost 
triples (6.6% in E1 vs. 18.0 % in E3).  Increases in the incidence of pre-retirement 
are mirrored by decreases in retirement after the ERA.  Early retirement before 65 
experiences a 15.5% reduction, while retirement at the NRA goes down by 30%. 
Overall, the introduction of the minimum pension implies a 10% increase in the 
occurrence of early and pre- retirement.  All in all, the introduction of minimum 
pensions (together with the other caps and ceilings) reduces the average retirement 
age by four months, from 63.0 to 62.66 years.  Most changes occur at the lowest 
end of the income distribution.   
The authors also show that the minimum pension has effects on individual saving 
behaviors.  The wealth effects implied by the guaranteed minimum can be quite 
substantial, leading to an upward shift in the life-cycle profile of consumption.  
This in turn implies lower savings at the first stages of the life cycle and lower 
accumulated assets (see Figure 5). 
But do these behavioral changes have meaningful effects on welfare?  The authors 
also attempt to estimate the welfare loss/gain resulting from the redistributive 
function of the minimum pension.27  On one side, the minimum pension benefits 
low income workers; on the other, it imposes higher contributions rates on the 
overall population.  The question is then, how much “extra” life-cycle 
consumption one would need to give to each individual in the sample to make 
him/her indifferent to the simultaneous (i) elimination of the minimum pension; 
                                                 
27 See Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez-Martín (2006 and 2007). The welfare effect is assessed by 
computing a compensated equivalent variation that keeps constant the average generosity of the system 
(in terms of its implicit internal rate of return).  See Appendix for a formal description of the 
methodology. 
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and (ii) reduction in the contribution rate.28  The results show that the welfare 
impact of the minimum pension is quite modest; a 0.6% increase in the life-cycle 
consumption of the median worker in the economy.  This low figure is, of course, 
the result of the cancelation of effects of opposite sign for different individuals. 
The gain for a low income worker that retires at the age of 60 is a substantial 3.3% 
of his/her life-cycle consumption.  For a worker of average earnings that stays 
active until age 65 the losses from higher contributions amount to almost 1% of 
his/her life-cycle consumption.  It is important to note, however, that these figures 
are extremely sensitive to changes in the growth rate of the minimum pensions.  
Also, the economic costs resulting from a reduction in labor supply as a result of 
early retirement are ignored.   
 The authors argue that these findings make it clear that minimum pensions should 
receive more attention in the current debate about the reform of the pension 
system in Spain (or any country with a similar system).  Indeed, it makes little 
sense to discuss changes aimed at fostering older workers' labor participation and, 
at the same time, to ignore the strong disincentive effects of minimum pensions.  
5. The fiscal cost of retirement income transfers 
 
As discussed in Section 2, beyond the potential impacts of retirement income 
transfers on savings and labor supply, one of the main sources of distortion is the 
cost of the transfer itself. This needs to be financed out of general revenues 
through some form of tax.29   In the case of minimum pensions offered within 
contributory systems the financing mechanism usually involves payroll taxes and 
employee contributions which increase the tax-wedge and can reduce the level of 
formal employment.  Evidence at the international level, for instance, suggests 
that a 1 percentage point increase in the tax-wedge can be associated with a 0.4 
percentage point reduction in the level of employment (see World Bank 2008).  In 
this section we use the Egyptian case to illustrate the tradeoff between a lower 
EMTR (which presumably reduces distortions in labor markets and provides 
better incentives to contribute) and higher fiscal costs.  We also look at the fiscal 
impact of the eligibility age.   
                                                 
28 In the calculations the contribution rate is reduced so that the average internal rate of return paid by 
the system remains unchanged after eliminating the minimum pension. 
29 Chapter xx discusses some of the issues related to the financing of social pensions. 
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 Egypt is an interesting case because the country is in the process of reforming its 
pension system; a classic defined benefit plan financed on a pay-as-you-go basis 
that includes a quasi non-contributory scheme to cover casual workers (see World 
Bank 2005).30  Under current arrangements, eligible casual workers contribute 1 
pound per month and receive upon retirement a flat pension equal to 80 pounds 
per month (around USD 8).  The contributory system also offers a minimum 
pension guarantee to plan members estimated at around 20 percent of economy 
wide average earnings.  Under the reform, these two programs are integrated 
under a new scheme that is reminiscent of the recent Chilean reform (see Section 
4).  In essence, all individuals aged 65 or more (the eligibility age is automatically 
indexed with life expectancy) become eligible for a basic pension (set at 15 
percent of economy wide average earnings).  This basic pension, however, is 
reduced as a function of the contributory pension which in the reformed system 
comes from notional and funded individual accounts.31  Thus, individuals who 
never contribute to the public pension system get the basic pension in full.  Those 
who contribute can get part of it depending on their contribution density and level 
of income.   
 
To evaluate the cost of the program under various designs we use a stochastic 
simulation model designed for Egypt that takes into account transitions in and out 
of the social security.32  The results show that, as presented in the Draft Law, the 
cost of the new system would start at around 0.7 percent of GDP, increase 
gradually over the next 30 years as a result of population aging, but then stabilize 
below 1 percent of GDP (see Figure 6).  The dynamics of these costs, however, 
are quite sensitive to both the taper rate and the indexation of the eligibility age.  
Without the automatic indexation of the eligibility age costs would almost double, 
reaching xx percent of GDP by the end of the simulation period.  Indexing the 
                                                 
30 A new Draft Social Security Law has been prepared and it is expected to be submitted to the 
parliament before the end of the calendar year. 
31 The contribution rate to the NDC and FDC portions are 15 and 5 percent respectively.   
32 The model decomposes the labor force into various occupations including civil servants, self-
employed, wage earners in the formal sector, and informal wage earners.  Within each category 
workers are divided by age, gender, and level of income.  Costs are estimated for each subgroup 
separately and then aggregated.  Members of each occupational category face different transition 
probabilities to move in and out of the social security.  For a detailed description of the model see Di 
Filippo and Robalino (forthcoming).   
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eligibility age thus becomes one of the most important instruments to neutralize 
the cost of the program on population aging.   
 
The claw-back rate has also important fiscal implications.  With a zero percent 
claw-back, basically the case of a universal pension that would impose the lowest 
distortion in the labor market, the cost of the program relative to the non-
indexation case could increase by 0.5 percentage point by the end of the 
simulation period.  At the other extreme, imposing a 100 percent claw-back rate 
would reduce the cost of the program by 1 percentage points over the long term 
relative to the no claw-back case.  Thus, going from a 100 percent to a 30 percent 
claw-back rate demands around 0.7 percent of GDP in additional fiscal revenues.  
As discussed in Chapter 7 mobilizing these resources can be an important 
challenge for many middle and low income countries.   
 
This raises the issue of having a broader targeting mechanism – albeit with a 
gradual taper rate.  The cost and benefits of targeting systems are discussed in 
Chapter xx.  As a preamble, however, it is worth emphasizing that the savings 
from a good targeting system can be considerable.  A recent study in countries in 
the Middle East and North Africa region, for instance, shows that perfect targeting 
(only the elderly poor are eligible) can cost between 2.3 and 24 times less than a 
universal pension (see Robalino et al. 2008b). 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper has discussed the potential distortions of retirement income transfers, 
focusing on labor market effects, savings decisions, and the fiscal costs of the 
programs.  The analysis has been constrained by the small number of rigorous 
impact evaluations of the various programs.  Nonetheless, from theory, 
simulations, and five case studies a few general findings with important policy 
implications can be derived. 
 
First, by and large, economic distortions taking place at the point where the 
benefit is paid and/or the point where the tax is levied will depend on the size of 
the transfer.  A transfer that represents 15 percent of economy wide average 
earnings (Egypt) is likely to have fewer impacts on behaviors and demand, other 
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things being equal, a lower level of taxation than a transfer that represents 42 
percent of economy wide average earnings (Brazil).  A transfer that is close to or 
equal to the minimum wage might also have more important effects on work 
incentives. 
 
Second, there is an unavoidable tradeoff between trying to contain distortions in 
the labor market by keeping low EMTRs, the number of people receiving 
transfers, and the cost of the program, which determines the need for other, 
explicit, distortionary taxes.  This suggests the existence of an “optimal” EMTR 
schedule.  While in practice trying to identify this optimum can be an elusive task, 
one can at least be confident that it is unlikely to involve zero targeting.  Thus, a 
“targeted” transfer would be a superior option to a universal transfer.  The choice 
of income base for the test is another policy question and similar arguments would 
indicate that a broader measure of income may be better than only pension 
income. 
 
Third, beyond the effect that retirement income transfers can have on the supply 
of labor, there can be effects on the choice between formal and informal sector 
work.  As discussed in the case of Chile, the claw-back rate (and the level of the 
benefit) can influence contribution densities and therefore the size of the effective 
coverage of the contributory system.  Policymakers should avoid design where the 
total pension (contributory plus non-contributory) paid by the public system does 
not increase as a function of contributions or where the transfer abruptly drops to 
zero after a certain level of income.  Consistent with the previous message, 
EMRTs below 100 percent should be preferred. 
 
Fourth, there is strong evidence that the income effect from the retirement 
transfers influences decisions about retirement.  The case studies of Brazil and 
Spain showed that by raising the opportunity cost of waiting to retire, retirement 
income transfers can induce more early retirement.  The eligibility age for the 
transfer therefore becomes a key policy variable.  This variable, along with the 
level of the transfer, will have the highest impact on the cost of the program.  A 
critical feature of a sustainable design is thus to index the eligibility age with 
changes in life expectancy.   
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 Fifth, the pure labor supply effects (hours worked) of retirement income transfers 
are more controversial. The Brazil and US case studies showed that transfers can 
reduce labor supply particularly in the ages close to retirement.  In Brazil, the 
reduction in labor supply takes place even if the program does not have “strings 
attached” (i.e., there is a pure income effect).  The South Africa case showed, 
however, that there are also indirect effects that need to be taken into account.  
While the social pension there does reduce labor supply among the eligible 
population, it also facilitates job search efforts among other prime age household 
members.  Overall, labor supply in that case can increase.   
 
Sixth, when it comes to savings, the evidence in US suggests that retirement 
income transfers can reduce saving rates.  The analysis of the Spanish minimum 
pension and the simulations presented in Section 3 also point in this direction and 
predict non-trivial effects.  Overall, however, the effect will depend on the level of 
the transfer relative to average earnings.  Modest transfers that focus on low 
income population groups that have a low savings capacity to start with, are likely 
to have very limited macroeconomic effects.   
 
Seventh, although still in “experimental design,” matching contributions appear as 
a promising instrument to ensure a minimum level of income during old-age and 
also stimulate compliance and reduce informality.  Other things being equal, our 
simulations in Section 2 suggest that matching contributions can provide better 
incentives to enroll and contribute among population groups with some savings 
capacity relative to minimum pension guarantees – except if these are conditioned 
on contribution densities, in which case they would be similar.  Matching 
contributions cannot be a substitute for non-contributory pensions, but could be an 
important complement, particularly to provide incentives to enroll and contribute 
to individuals with limited savings capacity.  The results even suggest that 
matching contributions could replace minimum pension guarantees in the 
contributory system.  As with the Chilean and Egyptian public pension systems, 
individuals who contribute would lose part of the flat subsidy that is provided in 
the absence of contributions.  Still, a higher expected pension (the sum of the 
contributory and non-contributory portions) would provide incentives to 
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contribute.  Individuals could save elsewhere without matching and still preserve 
part of the subsidy.  The matching contribution, however, would provide an 
additional incentive to save and also improve compliance.  
 
A final remark is that the design and implementation of retirement income 
transfers needs careful analysis and adequate planning and evaluation.  It is 
especially important that the potential impacts of interactions with other programs 
be considered. Given the set of uncertainties that surround an ex-ante evaluation 
of economic and social impacts, it would be desirable that the implementation of a 
new program proceeds gradually.  Countries could start with small pilots that 
would be expanded only after a rigorous evaluation.  
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Figure 1:  Means tested transfers 
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Figure 2:  Effects of Transfers on Contribution Densities and Average 
Retirement Ages  
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Figure 3:  Matching Contributions and Social Pensions  
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Figure 4. Simulated aggregate retirement probabilities by age in the 
economies with and without the minimum pension scheme.  
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Figure 5. The impact of minimum pension regulation on consumption, 
income, savings and assets. 
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Figure 6:  Fiscal Cost of Alternative Retirement Income Transfers in 
Egypt 
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Table 1:  Contribution Densities in Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Total 55 56.7 47.2 47.4 58.4 61
Sex       
   Men 56.9 61.2 53 55.4 59.6 63
   Women 55 55.6 39.7 35.7 57
Income bracket       
   Poorest quintile 44.1 36.9 28.6 21.9 42.9 31.4
   2nd quintile 51.4 48 43 40.9 55.9 54.8
   3rd quintile 54.5 54.5 48.7 50.3 60.3 62.9
   4th quintile 58.6 65.6 56.4 59.7 64.4 71.4
   Richest quintile 67.7 88.9 60.5 65.6 68.5 85.7
A
58.1
ge       
20 34.7 20 44.9 45.1 49 47.6
35 69.2 83.3 51.9 54.2 69.6 86.7
50 68 85 42.3 48.6 71.6 92.4
Argentina Chile Uruguay
 
Source:  Robalino 2008. 
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Appendix.  Assessing the Welfare impact of a Minimum Pension 
Scheme 
Low income workers, then, are the principal beneficiaries of the minimum pension 
scheme. Arguably this comes at the price of higher average contributions for the 
overall working population, emphasizing the distinctive redistributive character of this 
piece of the pension regulations.33 It is clear that both effects should be accounted for 
by any measure of the average welfare impact of minimum pensions. In this section, 
following Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez-Martín (2006, 2007) we assess the welfare 
effect by computing a compensated equivalent variation that keeps constant the 
average generosity of the system (in terms of its implicit internal rate of return). 
Before moving to the results we describe the main steps of the analysis.  
Definitions 
Individual -equivalent variation, i iθ , is the size of a parallel shift in his/her optimal 
consumption profile under the current system, c , that makes him/her indifferent to the 
simultaneous (1) elimination of the minimum pension and (2) reduction in the contribution 
rate that keeps the average generosity constant. Formally:  
mp
i
 
 ( (1 ) ) (mp mp mp mpi i i i i i iV c V c )θ τ ς τ ς∗ ∗ ∗ ∗+ , | = , |  
 
where j ji i iV c
jτ, ,  and jς  stand for life-cycle utility, consumption, optimal retirement and 
contribution rate under system j . The current system ( j mp= ) includes real-world 
contribution rates and minimum pensions. In the alternative system j = ∗  minimum pensions 
are absent and contributions are reduced to ς ∗  (a rate that guarantees the same average 
generosity in absence of minimum pensions. We measure the average generosity under 
system j  by the average internal rate of return: ( ) ( )j dP ij
i
r i= ∫r , with P i  denoting 
agent  measure. The  are defined in a standard way (the rates that match the expected 
discounted value of life cycle pension benefits and contributions).  
( )
i (r i)
                                                 
33In our framework, the redistributive role of minimum pensions is dominant, as the 
absence of health shocks eliminate the potencial efficiency gains of early withdrawals 
form the labor force and unemployment benefits. 
Detailed calculations 
The welfare calculation involves three steps:  
1. To compute the current system’s average internal rate of return r  we partition the sample 
(active individuals aged 55 or older) according to the wage and educational levels. Each 
individual is then assigned a “type” i  of the I  possible observable groups. The empirical 
measure (weight) of each group is denoted iµ . Recall than, on top of this observable 
heterogeneity, individuals differ in their unobservable relative value of leisure (implying 
different consumption paths and retirement ages for otherwise identical households). mpr  is 
then computed as follows:  
(a) We calculate r ( )mpi τ  i I∀ ∈  and for each possible retirement age. This 
implies solving the following nonlinear equation:  
 
1
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where  stands for age-  contributions, iacot a ( )
i
ab τ  for pension income in case of retirement at 
τ  and  is the probability of surviving to age  (conditional on surviving till age-20).  aS a
 
(b) For each i , we compute the retirement probabilities predicted at every age by 
our theoretical model, 
I∈
(iP )τ .  
We use them to find an internal rate of return that accounts for both observable and 
unobservable heterogeneity:  
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2. We work out the contribution rate (ς ∗ ) that results in the same implicit average rate 
of return in absence of minimum pensions. We allow individuals to change their 
optimal consumption and retirement behavior during the process.  
3. Finally, we compute the Equivalent Variation (θ ) associated with the elimination of 
the minimum pension scheme, while keeping constant the average generosity of the 
pension system.  
 
 
 
 2 
Results 
The detailed results from the analysis can be checked in Table A1, which reports the 
basic results, and Table A2, which explores the sensitivity of the results to the 
variation on the generosity of the system, measured by the projected growth rate of the 
minimum pensions. Note that Table 1 presents the results obtained assuming the same 
parameter values implemented in the Jiménez-Martín and Sánchez Martín (2006, 2007).34 
 
As regards Table A1, we find that the average welfare gain produced by minimum 
pensions is not very large: it amounts to approximately 0.6% of the life-cycle 
consumption of the median worker in the economy. This low figure is, of course, the 
result of the cancelation of effects of opposite sign for different individuals. The gain 
for a low income worker that retires at the age of 60 is a substantial 3.3% of his/her 
life-cycle consumption. For a worker of average earnings that stays active till 65 the 
losses from higher contributions amount to almost 1% of his/her life-cycle 
consumption.  
 
Table A1. Compensated equivalent variation by age of retirement, education and wage level 
(positive signs indicates welfare gains) 
age High Education Average Education 
 Q 1/3  Q 2/3 Q 3/3 Q1/3  Q 2/3 Q 3/3   
57 2.5831 -0.1015 -0.1015 3.4899 -0.1017 -0.1017  
58 2.5387 -0.1021 -0.1021 3.4280 -0.1024 -0.1024  
59 2.4966 -0.1027 -0.1027 3.3692 -0.1030 -0.1030  
60 2.4568 -0.1032 -0.1032 3.3133 -0.1035 -0.1035  
61 -0.1016 -0.1016 -0.1016 -0.0923 -0.1020 -0.1020  
62 -0.1009 -0.1009 -0.1009 -0.1013 -0.1013 -0.1013  
63 -0.0999 -0.0999 -0.0999 -0.1003 -0.1003 -0.1003  
64 -0.0997 -0.0997 -0.0997 -0.1001 -0.1001 -0.1001  
65 -0.0990 -0.0990 -0.0990 -0.0995 -0.0995 -0.0995  
 
Note that these figures are extremely sensitive to changes in the growth rate of the 
minimum pensions (see Table 2). In our benchmark simulation we assume a future 
growth rate of 0.5%, which is significantly smaller than the average for the 1985/2004 
interval. Had we extrapolated the historical figures, we would have found a much 
                                                 
34We consider 2 educational types and 3 labor earnings-quantiles. 
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larger welfare impact: an average equivalent variation of 3.6%, and welfare gains as 
large as 13% of life-cycle consumption for early retirees.  
 
Table A2. Compensated equivalent variation projecting historical growth rates of minimum 
pensions 
age High Education Average Education 
 Q 1/3  Q 2/3 Q 3/3 Q1/3  Q 2/3 Q 3/3   
58  13.5220 -0.2308 -0.2308 13.9952 -0.2314 -0.2314  
59  13.4186 -0.2321 -0.2321 13.7802 -0.2328 -0.2328  
60  13.2362 -0.2334 -0.2334 13.6807 -0.2341 -0.2341  
61  7.7155 -0.2298 -0.2298 8.8084 -0.2306 -0.2306  
62  3.3081 -0.2281 -0.2281 4.1861 -0.2289 -0.2289  
63  0.2378 -0.2258 -0.2258 0.9270 -0.2267 -0.2267  
64  -0.2222 -0.2254 -0.2254 -0.2142 -0.2263 -0.2263  
65  -0.2239 -0.2239 -0.2239 -0.2249 -0.2249 -0.2249  
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